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In the Global Computing scenario, trust-based systems have been proposed and studied as
an alternative to traditional security mechanisms. A promising line of research concerns
the so-called reputation-based computational trust. The approach here is that trust in a
computing agent is defined in terms of evidence of future behaviour based on interactions
in the past with its environment. We have previously argued how concepts and models
from concurrency theory can answer some fundamental challenges in the representation
of such interaction behaviour over time, using event structures as our choice of model
from concurrency theory. In this paper, we continue this line of research, addressing the
problem on how to transfer trust from one behavioural context to another. Our proposed
frameworks build on morphisms between event structures, and we prove some generic
results guaranteeing formal properties of transfers in the frameworks.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The Global Computing scenario foresees vast numbers of heterogeneous, networked, mobile, autonomous entities
interacting in various contexts, seeking to fulfil their respective goals. We think of entities broadly in terms of users
interacting through hardware devices like PDAs, Internet-connected PCs or mobile phones, or software, e.g. mobile agents
acting on behalf of some user or another piece of software. We will use the term computing agent for such an entity.
In the Global Computing scenario, computational trust has been proposed and studied as an alternative to traditional
security mechanisms. The classical trust management approach [1], first introduced by Blaze, Feigenbaum and Lacy [2], was
proposed as a solution to the inadequacy of traditional securitymechanisms in larger decentralised environments. A classical
trust management system deals with deciding the so-called compliance checking problem: given a request together with a
set of credentials, does the request comply with the local security policy of the provider?
Later the intuition behind trust management has been extended in many ways. Several models and systems have
been proposed within the Global Computing scenario, building on computational notions of trust resembling the trust
relationships among human beings in our daily human interaction. In a main line of research in this direction one models
trust among computing agents as notions of reputation. The computational notions of reputation are typically based on
monitoring the behaviours of computing agents in various contexts, or trust-related recommendations communicated among
computing agents. For good surveys on computational trust, we refer to e.g. [5,7,13].
We are mainly concerned with attempts towards a formal foundation for this type of reputation-based computational
trust. We have previously studied mathematical models for trust representations, including abstract and generic models
for the semantics of the trust policy languages applied in trust management systems. Our work also includes some general
formalmethodologies for reasoning about computational trust in general, see e.g. [8]. Furthermore, our trustmodels referred
to in this paper have served as the core of a considerable implementation effort, as reported e.g. in [3,4].
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In this paper we continue our work, addressing the important and difficult problem on how to transfer trust from one
context to another. As argued often in the literature on trust models, this is an important aspect of forming trust amongst
humans, in the sense that our trust in a particular person in one context is most often influenced by our trust in other
contexts.
As a crude example, suppose q is a supplier of books and movies, and that p cares about quality and shipping-time for
both products. Suppose also that p has information which indicates that the shipping time for q’s books is short, i.e.that p
has positive experience with q’s behaviour in the interaction protocol for ordering and delivering books. In other words, we
assume that q has a good reputation with respect to the behavioural profile of ‘‘fast delivery of books’’. It seems natural, that
this information would make it likely that the shipping-time for q’s movies is also short, i.e. that q also performs well in the
behavioural profile of ‘‘fast delivery of movies’’. However, the information would not make it more or less likely that the
quality of neither q’s books or movies is high.
Clearly the intuition behind examples like this also carries over to the Global Computing scenario, and hence it is a
challenge how to incorporate notions of transferring trust information from one context to another in trust-based systems
and models.
In this paper we introduce formal frameworks for modelling computational scenarios as described above. Following
our previous work, we model an interaction protocol (i.e. a particular context) by one of the many suitable models from
concurrency theory: event structures. Event structures have the advantage of being an abstract and concise model for
interaction protocols, but our results could also have been presented in other models from concurrency theory.
The interaction behaviour of a computing agent will be modelled by a decoration of the states of the event structure
(called configurations), representing the number of registered concrete occurrences of behaviours of a computing agent in
the protocol. And a behaviour profile (good or bad) will be modelled as in the example above by a subset of configurations.
As argued in [10] decorated event structures of this type are naturally equipped with orderings representing aspects
of the modelled information. We have previously identified and studied notions of information orderings, capturing the
total amount of information represented. Information orderings have mainly been used as the underlying orderings in
semantic definitions of trust-based policy languages using standard fixed-point theory. More importantly, we have also
identified various trust orderings, capturing the amount of information for particular behavioural profiles, and developed
order-theoretic techniques for reasoning about e.g. ‘‘proof carrying requests’’ in trust-based access control systems [8].
Here we propose and study formal and abstract frameworks for the transfer of computational trust between contexts.
More concretely, we propose and study formalisms for specifying the correlation between event occurrences in different
event structures, as e.g. the correlation between shipping times of books and movies in the example above. Our specific
proposal for such a specification formalism is one of the oldest and most studied in the literature of concurrency theory, the
event structuremorphisms of Winskel [18].
Our goals are to investigate to what extent event structure morphisms can serve as a sound formal specification of
‘‘transfer of reputation-based trust’’. The contributions will consist of developing the formal model for such a transfer, as
well as proofs of formal properties of the formalism. The main question addressed here is to what extent the formalism
supports the intuition from human interaction: more trust in a behavioural profile in one context results in more trust in
a corresponding profile in another context. Our answers to this question will be given in the form of monotonicity results
with respect to two different notions of trust orderings, one based on evidence and another based probability.
The paper is organised as follows. We start in Section 2 by briefly recalling the definitions of event structures and their
decorations used in modelling reputation based information. In Section 3 we define our specification formalism for the
transfer of trust based on event structure morphisms, and show some properties related to information ordering. Our main
results are presented in Section 4 (studying a trust order based on evidence for behaviour) and in Section 5 (studying a trust
order based on a probabilistic interpretation of behaviour), before ending with a few concluding remarks.
2. Interactions and event structures
In this section, we recall briefly the basic concepts of event structures aswell as our proposedmethodology for decorating
event structures with reputation-related information. Event structures were introduced byWinskel et al. in e.g. [11,17]. Our
previous work on reputation models based on event structures can be found in e.g. [9,10].
A computing agent in the Global Computing scenario will typically interact with its environment exchanging messages
following the patterns of interaction protocols. The basic idea is to use finite event structures as a formal model for such
protocols, and to use decorations of event structures as representations of the behaviour of computing agents.
Event structures are particularly well suited for this, introduced as a generic model for patterns of behaviour over
an abstract set of events. Event Structures capture three fundamental relationships between events in concurrent
computations: causality (the occurrence of one event being depending on the occurrence of another), conflict (two events
excluding each other from occurring), and independence (two events potentially occurring concurrently). Notice that we
restrict ourselves in the following definition to finite event structures.
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Fig. 1. An event structure describing our example. The curly lines∼ describe the immediate conflict relation, and pointed arrows the causality relation.
Definition 1 (Event Structure). An event structure is a triple (E,≤,#) consisting of a finite set E of eventswhich are partially
ordered by ≤, the causality relation, and where # is a binary, symmetric, irreflexive relation # ⊂ E × E, called the conflict
relation. The relations≤ and # satisfy for all e, e′, e′′ ∈ E
if e # e′ and e′ ≤ e′′ then e # e′′.
We say that events e, e′ ∈ E are independent if they are neither in the causality or the conflict relation, and that they are
in immediate conflict, writing e #µ e′, if e # e′ and
for all e0 ≤ e and e′0 ≤ e′, if e0 # e′0 then e0 = e and e′0 = e′.
As an example, the event structure in Fig. 1 represents a protocol, where an agent may ask a bank for the transfer of
electronic cash from its bank account to an electronic wallet. Aftermaking the request, the agent observes that the request is
either rejected (r) or granted (g). After a successful transaction, the agent could observe that the cash sent in the transaction
is forged (f) or perhaps run an authentication algorithm to establish that it is authentic (a). Also, the agent could observe a
withdrawal from its bank account with the present transaction’s id, and this withdrawal may be a correct (c) or an incorrect
(i) amount.
In the example from Fig. 1, only the causality and the immediate conflict relations are indicated. The events a and c are
independent, and r and a are in conflict, but not in immediate conflict.
The basic relations on event structures have an intuitivemeaning in our setup. An eventmay exclude the possibility of the
occurrence of a number of other events. In our example the occurrence of the event ‘request rejected’ clearly excludes (and
hence is in conflict with) the event ‘request granted’. The causality relation is also natural: some events are only possible
when others have already occurred. In the example structure, ‘money forged’ only makes sense in a transaction where the
transfer of money actually did occur (and hence is causally depending on the event ‘request granted’). Whether the e-cash is
authentic andwhether the correct amount is charged are two independent observations that may be observed, in any order,
which is modelled as independence in the event structure.
Following this intuition, the set of possible executions or runs of an event structure is captured formally by the notion of
a configuration, i.e. a set of events which can occur in a particular run of the protocol modelled.
Definition 2 (Event Structure Configurations). A configuration of an event structure ES = (E,≤,#) is a set of events x ⊆ E
satisfying the following two properties:
1.∀e, e′ ∈ x. (e, e′) ∉ # (x is conflict free)
2.∀e ∈ x, e′ ∈ E. e′ ≤ e ⇒ e′ ∈ x (x is causally closed)
Finally, we write CES for the set of configurations of ES, and say that two configurations x and y are compatible if x ∪ y is a
configuration.
For any e ∈ E we use the notation [e] for the special configuration consisting of e and the events on which e causally
depends:
[e] (def)= {e′ ∈ E | e′ ≤ e}
and we write [e) for [e] \ {e}.
We define relation→⊆ CES × E × CES by
x
e→ x′ def⇐⇒ e ∉ x and x′ = x ∪ {e},
and we say that x′ covers x if there exists an e such that x e→ x′.
Example 1. The configurations of our example from Fig. 1 are given in Fig. 2. In our example, [a] = {a, g}, and {a, g} c→
{a, g, c}.
Behaviour. As indicated above, the idea is now that a computing agent represents the behaviour of another by monitoring
the patterns of protocol interactions, formally in terms of observations over time of event structure configurations.
Definition 3 (Interaction History). Let ES = (E,≤,#) be an event structure. Define an interaction history in ES to be a finite
sequence of configurations, h = x1x2 · · · xn ∈ C∗ES . The elements of h are called sessions.
Example 2. An interaction history in the event structure from Fig. 1 could be the sequence {g, a, c}{g, c}{g}{r}.
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Fig. 2. Configurations of the event structure in Fig. 1.
An interaction history may change in two ways. Either a new session is initiated, or an existing session is updated with
the registration of additional events:
Definition 4 (Monitoring). Define an operation new : C∗ES → C∗ES by
new(h)
def= h∅.
Define also a partial operation update : C∗ES × E × N → C∗ES as follows. For any h = x1x2 · · · xi · · · xn ∈ C∗ES , e ∈ E, i ∈ N,
update(h, e, i) is defined only if i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and xi e→ xi ∪ {e}, in which case:
update(h, e, i)
def= x1x2 · · · (xi ∪ {e}) · · · xn.
Let h0 ⇒ h1 denote that either new(h0) = h1 or there exists e ∈ E, i ∈ N such that update(h0, e, i) = h1, and let⇒∗ denote
the reflexive and transitive closure of⇒.
Our approach in the following is to base our notions of evidence of behaviour on counting the configurations occurring in
histories. Formally, we are simply going to decorate the configurations of an event structure with the number of registered
occurrences in an interaction history (forgetting about the ordering of their occurrences).
Definition 5 (Interaction Decorations). Let ES be an event structure. A decoration d of its configurations is a function d :
CES → N. The trivial decoration associates 0 with every configuration. We write DES for the set of decorations of ES, and
NDES for the set of non-trivial decorations. Notationally, we extend decorations d of an event structure ES to sets of
configurations, such that for any set X ⊆ CES
d(X) def=

x∈X
d(x).
For any interaction history h = x1x2 · · · xn ∈ CES∗, we define a decoration dech, such that for every x ∈ CES ,
dech(x)
def= |{j ∈ N | 1 ≤ j ≤ n, xj = x}|.
3. Transfer of interaction information
The main topic of this paper is the transfer of interaction information from one context (event structure) to another. We
aim at formalising the intuition that behaviour in one context may be seen as an indication of a certain behaviour in another
context. In our concrete setup, this requires a specification formalism for correlations between event occurrences from two
different event structures.
The structural relationship between events of different event structures has already been studied heavily in the literature
in the form of categorical morphisms capturing exactly various forms of ‘correlations’ between event occurrences. Hence,
it seems natural to look for suitable extensions of such existing categorical frameworks taking evidence decorations into
account. In this paper we choose one of the first and most studied notions of morphisms in the literature, originally
introduced by Winskel (see e.g [18,19]).
Definition 6 (Morphisms of Event Structures). Let ES = (E,≤,#) and ES ′ = (E ′,≤′,#′) be event structures. A morphism,
η : ES → ES ′ is a partial function η : E → E ′ which has the following two properties:
• for any e ∈ E, if η(e) is defined then [η(e)] ⊆ η([e])
• for any e0, e1 ∈ E such that η(e0) and η(e1) are both defined,
η(e0) (#′ ∪ IdE′) η(e1)⇒ e0 (# ∪ IdE) e1.
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In the definition above we use the notation IdX for the identity function on a set X , and we have notationally extended
the partial function η : ES → ES ′ to a total function on sets of events in the standard way, i.e. for any x ⊆ E
η(x)
def= {η(e) | e ∈ x}.
Our notion of event structure morphism enjoys a number of useful (categorical) properties. For details we refer to e.g. [19].
Here we only mention the following property of relevance for the results to follow.
Proposition 1. For every morphism η : ES → ES ′, and any configuration x ∈ CES , η(x) is a configuration in ES ′, and for every
event e′ in ES ′, η−1(e′) is a (possibly empty) set of mutually conflicting events in ES.
The original intuition behind this definition of morphism was that an occurrence of e in ES is to be thought of as an
indication of an occurrence of η(e) in ES ′. The set η−1(e′) can then be thought of as a disjunction of indications, in the sense
that an occurrence of any e ∈ η−1(e′) in ES is an indication of an occurrence of e′ in ES ′.
We are going to follow this intuition in our use ofmorphisms as the structural specification of the transfer of observations
(decorations) from one event structure to another. Notice, that amorphism η : ES → ES ′ is a flexible formalism, in the sense
that e.g. parts of the behaviour of ES may be specified as irrelevant for the expected behaviour in ES ′ (η not a total function),
and that parts of the behaviour in ES ′ may be specified as uninfluenced by the behaviour in ES (η not onto).
Given our interpretation of morphisms, the following definition captures naturally the associated transfer of decorations
of configurations.
Definition 7 (Transfer of decorations). Let η : ES → ES ′ be an event structure morphism, and let d be a decoration of ES.
The η-transferred decoration of d is defined as the decoration dη of ES ′, such that for any configuration x′ of ES ′
dη(x′) def=

η(x)=x′
d(x).
Example 3. Consider the event structure with the configurations from Fig. 2 and a decoration dwith the following non-zero
decorations:
d({r}) = 3, d({g}) = 3, d({g, a}) = 6, d({g, a, c}) = 2.
Consider also an event structurewith only two conflicting eventsbad andgood, and amorphismη such thatη(r) = bad,
η(a) = good, and η undefined otherwise.
The decoration d then transfers to dη with the following non-zero decorations:
dη({Ø}) = 3, dη({bad}) = 3, dη({good}) = 8.
Information ordering. In the remainder of this paper we are going to look for properties of our specification formalism for the
transfer of reputation-based information.
We start by illustrating that our notion of transfer satisfies an expectedmonotonicity propertywith respect to the amount
of collected information, formally in the form of a monotonicity result with respect to a notion of information ordering on
decorated event structures.
The main motivation behind information orderings as introduced in e.g. [10] is to provide a mathematical framework
for the semantics of trust policy languages. To give an idea of how to define such an information ordering in our setting,
consider the following definition, formalising the intuitive idea, that for any configuration x, ‘‘more information’’ means
more observations including the elements of x.
Definition 8 (Information Ordering). Let ES be an event structure. For any configuration x, we use the notation
x↑ def= {x′ ∈ CES | x ⊆ x′}
and we extend this notation to sets of configurations X↑ in the obvious way.
The information ordering on decorations of an event structure ES is defined as the binary relation⊑⊆ DES ×DES where
d0 ⊑ d1 iff for all configurations x of ES, d0(x↑) ≤ d1(x↑).
Proposition 2. The relation⊑ is a partial order onDES .
Proof. Simple inspection. 
The following proposition (see also [10]) states that updates of histories are monotone.
Theorem 1. The decoration mapping dec is monotone in the sense that for any event structure ES with interaction histories
h0, h1 ∈ CES∗
h0 ⇒∗ h1 ⇒ dech0 ⊑ dech1 .
Proof. By definition, h0 ⇒ h1 if and only if (i) an event is added; or (ii) a new configuration is started. In each case the
proposition holds. 
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Following ideas from e.g. [10], the information ordering as defined above can be extended to a complete lattice by extending
DES with an additional top element. As argued in [8], the information ordering may hence be used as a well-founded basis
for the denotational semantics of trust policy languages with ⊑-monotone operations, building on ideas first proposed by
Weeks in [16].
The following proposition states that our transfer of decorations specified by morphisms preserves the notion of
information ordering, in the sense that ‘‘more information’’ in the transferring decorated event structure implies ‘‘more
information’’ in the receiving structure.
Theorem 2. Let ES and ES ′ be event structures with morphism η : ES → ES ′. For every two decorations d0 and d1 of ES
d0 ⊑ d1 ⇒ dη0 ⊑ dη1.
Proof. Follows from the fact that for any configuration x′ in ES ′, dη(x′↑) = d(X), where X = {x ∈ CES | η(x) ⊇ x′}, and the
fact that X is an upwards closed set. 
4. Transfer of evidence
The information ordering ⊑ introduced above only captures the amount of observations collected in interacting with a
computing agent. A more central notion of any trust-based formalism is an ordering capturing ‘‘the degree of trust’’. It is
less clear how to formalise a suitable general notion of ordering ≼ capturing such an intuition. Given an arbitrary event
structure ES with decorations d0 and d1 inDES , what should d0 ≼ d1 mean? In a simple setting where the events of ES are
say {good, bad}with good # bad, one might take d0 ≼ d1 only if
d0(good↑) ≤ d1(good↑) and d0(bad↑) ≥ d1(bad↑).
However, in general the choice of good and bad configurations depends on subjective assessments. Hence, we propose here
a notion of trust ordering for each choice of behavioural ‘profiles’, expressed as a set of incompatible configurations. And
our notion of ‘‘more trust’’ in a profile will then be captured by ‘‘more evidence in favour of’’ the profile.
Formally, the notion of evidence in favour of a profile is chosen to be the proportion of monitored occurrences of
configurations supporting the profile, as formalised in the following definition.
Definition 9 (Evidence and Profile). For an event structure ES, and a nontrivial decoration d ∈ NDES , the evidence for d, is
the function assigning real numbers to configurations, evd : CES → R, where for any configuration x ∈ CES :
evd(x)
def= d(x↑)/d(CES).
A set of mutually incompatible configurations P is called a profile of ES. The definition of evidence for configurations extends
naturally to profiles P:
evd(P)
def=

x∈P
evd(x).
Example 4. Consider the event structure of our running electronic cash example from Fig. 2. A profile capturing bad
behaviour could consist of the two configurations {r} and {g,f,i}.With the decoration of the configurations fromExample 3,
the evidence for {r} is 314 and the evidence for {g, f, i} is 0.
With this definition of evidence, we get the following definition of trust orderings parameterised by profiles.
Definition 10 (Evidence-Based Trust Orderings). Let ES be an event structure and let P be a profile P ⊆ CES . Define the
evidence-based trust ordering with respect to P as a binary relation≼P onNDES as follows:
d0 ≼P d1 def⇐⇒ evd0(P) ≤ evd1(P).
Proposition 3. For all event structures ES and all profiles P of ES,≼P is a preorder onNDES .
Proof. Simple inspection. 
In previous work, we have developed frameworks for similar notions of trust orderings, including results towards a
mathematical foundation for ‘‘proof carrying requests’’ in trust-based access control systems [8].
Our goal here is to provide our framework with results supporting the underlying goal of transfer of evidence: the more
evidence for someprofile in the transferring system, themore evidence for the corresponding profile in the receiving system.
The following theorem expresses a concrete formulation of ‘‘corresponding’’ (η⊇-related) profiles, guaranteeing the desired
monotonicity property: for any specification morphism η : ES → ES ′ and any η⊇-related profiles P in ES and P ′ in ES ′, η
defines a monotone transfer of evidence from P to P ′.
Theorem 3. Let ES and ES ′ be event structures with morphism η : ES → ES ′. Two profiles P of ES and P ′ of ES ′ are said to be
η⊇-related iff
• ∀x ∈ P. ∃x′ ∈ P ′. η(x) ⊇ x′
• ∀x ∈ CES . [ ∃y′ ∈ P ′. η(x) ⊇ y′ ] ⇒ [ ∃y ∈ P. x ⊇ y].
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For all η⊇-related profiles P and P ′
d0 ≼P d1 ⇒ dη0 ≼P ′ dη1.
Proof. The monotonicity property follows from the fact that for any profile P and any decoration d
d(P↑) =

x∈P
d(x↑)
and the following observations from the definition of dη:
dη(x′↑) =

η(x)⊇x′
d(x)
dη(CES′) = d(CES). 
The theorem above specifies conditions under which a morphism η : ES → ES ′ can be seen as transferring evidence
monotonically from one profile to another. Given two event structures ES and ES ′, many profiles will satisfy the conditions
of Theorem 3. However, not all profiles of ES can be transferred in this way, but for any profile P ′ from ES ′ at least one profile
from ES is transferred monotonically to P ′, as stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let ES and ES ′ be event structures with morphism η : ES → ES ′. For any profile P ′ ⊆ CES′ ,
P
def=

x′∈P ′
min({x ∈ CES | η(x) ⊇ x′})
where
min(X)
def= {x ∈ X | ∀x′ ∈ X . x′ ⊆ x ⇒ x′ = x}
is a (possibly empty) profile in ES, such that for any two decorations d0 and d1 ofNDES ,
d0 ≼P d1 ⇒ dη0 ≼P ′ dη1.
Proof. The fact that P as defined is indeed a profile (i.e., a set of mutually incompatible configurations), follows from the
definition ofmorphisms. P and P ′ areη⊇-related from the definition of P , and hence the theorem follows fromTheorem3. 
Proposition 4. Let ES be an event structure with a decoration d ∈ NDES , and let P be a profile P ⊆ CES . Then evd(P) is a rational
number between 0 and 1.
Proof. Simple inspection. 
Given this proposition, and following our underlyingmotivation, it would be natural to look for some kind of probabilistic
interpretation of our notion of evidence. However, it is not immediately obvious how to do this in general. In restricted
settings, probabilistic interpretations are indeed possible, as expressed in the following proposition, restricting to settings
where only completed executions of interaction protocols are monitored, i.e. only maximal event structure configurations
are observed:
Proposition 5. Let ES be an event structure with decoration d ∈ NDES , such that for all non-maximal configurations x of ES,
d(x) = 0. Then for any maximal profile P in ES, evd is a probability distribution on P.
Proof. Follows from the facts that for any two configurations x, y in P , x↑ ∩ y↑ = Ø (follows from P being a profile), and that
any maximal configuration z belongs to x↑ for at least one x belonging to P (follows from P being maximal). 
As illustrated by this proposition, our evidence-based framework only takes concrete registrations of configurations into
account, and not any expectation based on registration of sub-configurations. As an example, in the event structure from
Fig. 1, the evidence for an occurrence of say eventa is independent of the decoration of configurations {r} and {g}, where any
probabilistic model of the electronic cash examplewould naturally have the expectation of a depending on the observations
of {r} and {g}. There are several ways in which to extend our formalism in order also to take such expectations into account.
In the following we pursue one such extended approach based on existing work on probabilistic event structures.
5. Probabilistic event structures
In the previous section we showed formal properties of transferring a notion of evidence in a simple trust model based
on monitoring interaction protocols represented by event structures, with observations of occurrences of configurations. In
this section we aim at similar results for a probabilistic event structure model based on monitoring event occurrences as
introduced in [9].
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The approach here is really based on observations of event occurrences only, but for simplicity we choose to phrase
our results on the formalism of observations of configurations introduced above, even though our results below are
clearly aimed at the more restricted setting only (that is with non-zero decoration only of configurations of the form [e]
for events e).
The overall goal of our modelling is an attempt to predict the future behaviour of an agent from an interaction history
representing the past behaviour of the same agent. This is naturally expressed in terms of probabilities of future behaviours.
In order to base a definition of such probabilities on formal theoretical grounds, following the work on probabilistic event
structures in e.g., [15], we shall restrict ourselves to a certain subclass of event structures, the so-called confusion-free event
structures. One of the main properties achieved in this approach is a framework in which structural independence in event
structures implies also probabilistic independence.
The model introduced in [10] is formally based on applying a standard Bayesian approach obtaining Dirichlet
distributions on the cells of confusion-free event structures based on monitoring event occurrences in interactions. In the
following subsection we briefly recall the notion of confusion-free event structures, and our methodology of adjoining
probabilities from event occurrences.
5.1. Confusion-free event structures
Confusion-freeness was originally introduced in the theory of Petri nets (see e.g. [12]), and later adapted to event
structures. Intuitively, confusion-freeness captures models with a ‘‘clean separation between conflict and independence’’.
It is well-known that confusion-free systems are particularly well suited for representing probabilistic concurrent systems,
as argued by e.g. Varacca et al. in [15]. As we shall see, the same observation holds also for developing a formal probabilistic
prediction of behaviours based on interaction histories.
As in [15], we define confusion-freeness in terms of cells. Cells represent choices—in probabilistic event structures,
probabilistic choices.
Definition 11 (Cells and Confusion-Freeness). Let ES = (E,≤,#) be an event structure. A partial cell in ES is a non-empty
set of events y ⊆ E such that e, e′ ∈ y implies e #µ e′ and [e) = [e′). A maximal partial cell is called a cell. ES = (E,≤,#)
is confusion-free iff (the reflexive closure of) immediate conflict is an equivalence relation and within cells (i.e., that e #µ e′
implies [e) = [e′)). A morphism η : ES → ES ′ is said to be cell reflecting iff for all cells c ′ of ES ′, η−1(c ′) is a cell in ES.
Example 5. There are three cells in the event structure from Fig. 1: {r, g}, {a, f} and {c, i}. The event structure in Fig. 1 is
indeed confusion-free. For further examples and properties of confusion-free structures, see e.g. [15].
Definition 12 (Cell Valuation [15]). A cell valuation on a confusion-free event structure ES = (E,≤,#) is a function p : E →
[0, 1] such that for every cell c , we havee∈c p(e) = 1.
Cell valuations are intended to represent probabilistic choices among the events within a cell, and the underlying
probabilistic assumption is that the structural independence between cells is respected also by probabilistic independence,
i.e. that one can obtain the probability of any configuration x as the product of the probabilities of each event in x given p,
as formalised in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 ([15]). Let ES be a confusion-free event structure. For any cell valuation p on ES, let v(p) : CES → [0, 1] be
defined by v(p)(x) =e∈x p(e). Then we have
• v(p)(∅) = 1 (normality)
• if X is a non-empty, maximal set of pairwise incompatible configurations covering x ∈ CES , then v(p)(X) = v(p)(x)
(conservation)
• if x, x′ ∈ CES are compatible then v(p)(x) · v(p)(x′) = v(p)(x ∪ x′) · v(p)(x ∩ x′) (independence).
A function v satisfying the three properties of this proposition is called a configuration valuation. A configuration valuation
assigns a probability to each (finite) configuration. Normality means that the empty configuration always occurs in an
execution. Conservation means that if c is a cell enabled at configuration x, then v defines a probability distribution on
the configurations X = {x ∪ {e} | e ∈ c} (where v(x) ≠ 0). Finally, independence means that the ‘‘probability of event e’’ is
independent of the configuration we are at when sampling from c.
5.2. Probabilities from interaction observations
Our overall aim is now to assign probabilities to the configurations of a finite confusion-free event structure ES derived
from the experience obtained from interaction behaviours, i.e., decorations of ES. By Proposition 6we can do this by defining
a cell valuation p : E → [0, 1].
In [9,10] we developed a general probabilistic foundation for such a definition of cell valuations, estimating the
(unknown) probabilities of events in cells based on standard Bayesian analysis. We make use of the fact that the family
of Dirichlet distributions is a family of conjugate priors to the family of multinomial trials (corresponding to our notion of
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decorating events with event counts), and hence we use Dirichlet distributions as our prior distributions in the Bayesian
analysis.
To be more specific, in our setting we estimate the parameters of Dirichlet distributions for each cell c based on the
parameters of a prior distribution, i.e. a set of positive real numbers {αc,e | e ∈ c}, and the evidence for the events in c
obtained from observations of interactions. We refer to [9,10] for details.
The only thing of importance for us here is that the analysis provides us with a well-foundedmethodology for estimating
the probabilities in a cell evaluation in the form of the expected probabilities in the resulting Dirichlet distributions. For
simplicity, we choose here only to give the resulting assignment of probabilities in the case of the uniform prior distribution
representing ‘‘no prior information’’ (all αc.e equal to 1), but our results in the following can be generalised also to other
scenarios.
Proposition 7. Let ES be a confusion-free event structure with events E and with decoration d ∈ DES . For every event e in E, let
cell(e) denote the cell c with e ∈ c. Define cellvd : E → R, such that for every event e in ES
cellvd(e)
def= d([e]
↑)+ 1
d([cell(e)]↑)+ |cell(e)|
where we use the notation
d([cell(e)]↑) def=

e′∈cell(e)
d([e′]↑).
Then cellvd is a cell valuation (the cell valuation of d).
Proof. Simple inspection. 
Example 6. Consider the event structure of our running electronic cash example from Fig. 2, and its decoration from
Example 3. The cell valuations of the three cells (see Example 5) define the following probability distributions:
• r: 0.25 and g: 0.75
• f: 0.1 and a: 0.9
• i: 0.25 and c: 0.75.
5.3. Probabilistic trust orderings
We are now in a position to introduce a probabilistic notion of trust ordering on decorated confusion-free event
structures.
Definition 13 (Probabilistic Trust Orderings). Let ES be a confusion-free event structure, and let P be a profile in ES. Define
a binary relation EP onDES such that for any two decorations d0 and d1, d0 EP d1 iff d0 ⊑ d1 and for all e belonging to some
x ∈ P ,
d0([e]↑)+ 1
d0([cell(e)]↑)+ 1 ≤
d1([e]↑)+ 1
d1([cell(e)]↑)+ 1 .
The first condition in the definition of d0 EP d1 says that d0 and d1 are ordered with respect to information as defined in
Definition 8, and the second that the relative weight of any e ∈ x in its cell is non-decreasing.
Proposition 8. Let ES be a confusion-free event structure. For any profile P of ES, the relation EP is a pre-order onDES .
Proof. Simple inspection. 
The following proposition states that the proposed ordering indeed respects our probabilistic interpretation:
Proposition 9. Let ES be a confusion-free event structure, and let x ∈ CES . Let d0, d1 ∈ DES and assume that d0 E{x} d1. Then,
v(cellvd0)(x) ≤ v(cellvd1)(x).
Proof. It follows from the assumption d0 E{x} d1 and simple calculations, that for all e in x, cellvd0(e)≤ cellvd1(e). Since this
holds for all e ∈ x, the claim follows from definition of v in Proposition 6. 
Furthermore, our notion of probabilistic trust orderings satisfy a monotonicity property very similar to the property
for evidence-based trust orderings expressed in Theorem 3: for any cell reflecting morphism η, a dual formulation of
‘‘corresponding’’ (η⊆-related) profiles guaranteeing that the transfer defined by η is monotone.
Theorem 4. Let ES and ES ′ be confusion-free event structures with a cell reflecting morphism η : ES → ES ′. Two profiles P of ES
and P ′ of ES ′ are said to be η⊆-related iff
• ∀x ∈ P. ∃x′ ∈ P ′. η(x) ⊆ x′
• ∀x ∈ CES . [ ∃y′ ∈ P ′. η(x) ⊆ y′ ] ⇒ [ ∃y ∈ P. x ⊆ y].
For all η⊆-related profiles P and P ′
d0 EP d1 ⇒ dη0 EP ′ dη1.
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Proof. Assume that d0 EP d1, we need to show that d
η
0 EP ′ d
η
1 . The fact that d
η
0 ⊑ dη1 follows directly from Theorem 2.
So, we need to show for all e′ ∈ x′ for some x′ ∈ P ′
dη0([e′]↑)+ 1
dη0([cell(e′)]↑)+ 1
≤ d
η
1([e′]↑)+ 1
dη1([cell(e′)]↑)+ 1
.
First, assume that η−1(e′) is empty. Then dη([e′]↑) = 0 for all decorations d, and the required property then follows from
dη0 ⊑ dη1 .
Next assume that η−1(e′) is non-empty. From the assumption that P and P ′ are η⊆-related it follows, that e ∈ x for some
x ∈ P .
Furthermore, from the fact that η is cell reflecting, η−1(e′) is a subset of a cell c in ES, such that for any decoration d of ES
dη([e′]↑) =

η(e)=e′
d([e]↑)
and
dη([cell(e′)]↑) = d([c]↑).
From this, the required property follows from d0 EP d1 and simple calculations. 
Similarly, we get a dual version of Corollary 1.
Corollary 2. Let ES and ES ′ be confusion-free event structures with a cell reflecting morphism η : ES → ES ′. For any profile
P ′ ⊆ CES′ ,
P
def=

x′∈P ′
max({x ∈ CES | η(x) ⊆ x′})
where
max(X)
def= {x ∈ X | ∀x′ ∈ X . x′ ⊇ x ⇒ x′ = x}
is a (possibly empty) profile in ES, such that for any two decorations d0 and d1 ofNDES ,
d0 EP d1 ⇒ dη0 EP ′ dη1.
Proof. The fact that P as defined is indeed a profile (i.e. a set of mutually incompatible configurations), follows from the
definition of morphisms. P and P ′ are easily seen to be η⊆-related from the definition of P , and the theorem then follows
from Theorem 4. 
6. Conclusion
In this paperwehave proposed and studied formal frameworks for transferring computational trust information between
contexts. Building on previous work on models for computational trust, we have modelled contexts by event structures,
behaviours by event structure decorations, and behavioural profiles by subsets of event structure configurations. As a novel
contribution to themodels, we propose to usemorphisms as a specification formalism for transferring information between
event structures.
The intention of such a specification is to support the intuition of transferring information in favour of certain behavioural
profiles in one context to information in favour of certain profiles in another context: the more trust in a profile in the
transferring context, the more trust in a corresponding profile in the receiving context. Our main results present conditions
on such pairs of profiles in order for this intention to be satisfied. The results take the form of monotonicity results with
respect to two different notions of trust orderings, one based on evidence and another based on probabilities.
We feel confident that our frameworks are on the right track towards a formal foundation for transferring trust-related
information between contexts. But our results here are only preliminary, and many questions remain to be addressed. First
of all, the monotonicity results provided here are only indications of the soundness of our approach, and we are still missing
techniques for reasoning about the effects of transferring trust-related information.
Our approach here is also based on a number of choices, some of which are open for alternatives. As an example, we
have chosen here to base our notion of transfer on a standard notion of morphisms between event structures. This notion
was clearly introduced with different purposes, and hence it is not immediately clear that this is the best choice as basis for
transfer of trust. We have previously suggested an alternative notion of morphisms [10], but arguments for the best choice
still need to be investigated.
Our notions of trust-related orderings are also open for alternatives. As an example it seems natural to look also for
similar results in settingswhere decorations of event structures are interpreted in the spirit of theDempster–Shafer theory of
uncertainty [14,6], as previously suggested in [10].We are confident that such results can be obtained using themethodology
presented in this paper.
Asmentioned earlier, our trust models referred to in this paper have served as the core of a considerable implementation
effort, as reported e.g. in [3,4]. However, the current proposal of formalisms for transferring trust-related information still
needs to be supplementedwith some concrete experimental work in order to fully understand the strengths and limitations
of our proposed frameworks.
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